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ALD-329

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-1827
___________
DAVID PODLOG,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN FORT DIX FCI
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 13-cv-7375)
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
August 7, 2014
Before: RENDELL, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 08, 2014)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
David Podlog, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals
from the District Court’s order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction his petition filed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Because his appeal presents no substantial question, we
will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

I.
In 1993, a jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, found Podlog guilty of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The District Judge thereafter concluded that Podlog’s
offense level and criminal history category mandated a sentence of 324 months in prison
and five years of supervised release. Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence.
In 1997, Podlog sought collateral relief by filing a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255. The District Court denied Podlog’s motion and the Court of Appeals denied his
request for a certificate of appealability. In 2013, the Court of Appeals denied Podlog’s
request for permission to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition..
In December 2013, Podlog filed the current petition for a writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
where he is now incarcerated. Although Podlog couched his claim as one of “actual
innocence,” his primary contention was that his 27-year sentence was unconstitutional
under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because the District Judge, not a
jury, determined the quantity of drugs involved in his crime. The District Court dismissed
Podlog’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, determining that Podlog’s claim concerning the
legality of his sentence could only be raised—if at all—in a Section 2255 motion. See
Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2002); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245
(3d Cir. 1997). The District Court also declined to transfer the petition to the United
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States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit as a request to file a second or successive
28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, because that Court had already considered and rejected the
claim presented in the current petition.
Podlog now appeals.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise plenary review
over the district court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its
factual findings.” Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002).
The District Court did not err in dismissing Podlog’s petition. A federal prisoner
can seek relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if the remedy provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is
“inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of his or her detention. Cradle, 290 F.3d at
538; Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120. This occurs “only where the petitioner demonstrates that
some limitation of scope of procedure would prevent” the petitioner from receiving
adequate adjudication of his or her claims. Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538. This exception is
extremely narrow and applies only in rare circumstances. See, e.g., In re Dorsainvil, 119
F.3d at 251-52.
Podlog cannot avail himself of the exception in this case. In In re Dorsainvil, we
held that Section 2241 allows relief when a subsequent statutory interpretation renders a
petitioner’s conduct no longer criminal. Id. Although Podlog tries to fit his claims into the
In re Dorsainvil exception, he has not alleged that the actions resulting in his conviction
have been de-criminalized. Rather, he asserts that the decision in Apprendi rendered his
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sentence illegal because the judge—rather than the jury—determined the quantity of
drugs involved in his crime. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (holding that, “[o]ther than
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt”). As the District Court explained, we have stated that, “[u]nlike the
intervening change in law in In re Dorsainvil that potentially made the crime for which
that petitioner was convicted non-criminal, Apprendi dealt with sentencing and did not
render . . . the crime for which [the petitioner] was convicted, not criminal.” Okereke,
307 F.3d at 120. We then held that Section “2255 [i]s not inadequate or ineffective for [a
prisoner] to raise his Apprendi argument.” Id. at 121.
In short, the District Court did not err in dismissing Podlog’s petition. He did not
demonstrate that Apprendi, or any other change in the law, has rendered the crime for
which he was convicted non-criminal. Accordingly, the In re Dorsainvil exception does
not apply, and Podlog has not established that Section 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective”
to challenge the legality of his detention. In addition, for the reasons explained by the
District Court, it properly declined to construe Podlog’s petition as one for leave to file a
second or successive Section 2255 motion and transfer it to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.
For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents “no substantial question,”
and will therefore summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R.
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
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